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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Using the four Biotechnology Uses and Development surveys of Statistics Canada, we analyse 
the relative importance of funding and support as well as collaboration and contracting, R&D 
and IP strategies on the propensity to patent of Canadian biotechnology firms. Our model 
accounts for the potential endogeneity due to the simultaneity of some of these strategies. 
Controlling for various firm characteristics, the stage of development  of the firm and the 
sources of its revenues, we find that collaboration with other firms does matter for patenting, 
as  well  as  R&D,  even  when  controlling  for  potential  endogeneity.  IP  strategies  and 
contracting out activities also increase the propensity of a firm to patent. And so does angel 
and venture capital funding. 
 
Mots clés : Innovation, Patents, Collaboration, Contracts, R&D, 
Biotechnology. 
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1.  Introduction 
Biotechnology firms require two very important resources to be innovative and eventually to 
survive: external collaborators/partners (Deeds and Hill, 1996; Oliver, 2004; Powell et al., 1996) 
and specific funding according to their stage of development (Hall and Bagchi-Sen, 2002) and 
that  of  their  products.  Several  studies  have  indicated  the  importance  of  collaboration  for 
technology and innovation, adding to the internal innovation capabilities of the firm (Deeds and 
Rothaermel,  2003;  Hagedoorn,  2002).  In  general,  the  literature  finds  a  positive  influence  of 
collaboration on the innovative performance of firms (Baum et al., 2000; Deeds and Hill, 1996; 
Faems et al. 2005; Rogers, 2004; Shan et al., 1994; Stuart, 2000).  
While some collaboration agreements are accompanied with funding agreements, a great number 
of other sources of funding are available to biotechnology firms. A number of scholars mention 
the necessity for venture capital in the early and highly innovative stages of the firm (Kortum 
and Lerner, 2000; Engel and Keilbach, 2007). Baum and Silverman (2004) for instance show 
that government funding has a positive effect on the propensity to patent, but that venture capital 
has  no  effect.  Other  studies  are  in  agreement  regarding  the  incapacity  of  traditional  debt 
financing to provide the right funding for highly risky R&D phases of projects (Czarnitzki and 
Kraft, 2009; Hall, 2002; Gompers and Lerner, 2001). 
Considering  the  fact  that  collaboration  and  contracting  has  an  influence  on  innovative 
performance, that funds and government intervention all play a role, the goal of this project is to 
verify that this is also the case for small and medium biotechnology firms. If there is a field for 
which patents are well suited, it is definitely biotechnology. As a consequence, we measure 
innovative  performance  in  terms  of  patenting.  We  have  the  chance  of  working  with  a  very 
complete  database  on  Canadian  biotechnology  firms  covering  8  years,  which  allows  the 
characterisation of a great number of aspects of these firms over the years. For instance, we have 
access to the number of products of the firm at each stage of development. While small biotech 
firms did not intend to replace large pharmaceutical industries and produce drugs themselves, 
does the current business model allow them to maintain a number of products at different stages 
of development or does one key product drives the behaviour of the entire firm? Are they merely 
the transfer channel between science and large pharmaceutical companies? Some authors argue 
that “biotechnology as such is not an industry, but refers more to a set of technologies that   2 
profoundly  affect  existing  industries  such  as  agriculture,  food-processing  and  human  health 
(Pisano, 2002)” (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2006, p. 6). As a consequence, one may be inclined to 
think that firms that have products further along the development stage may not be as innovative 
as they were in the past. Although Klepper (1996) shows that product innovation dominate the 
early stages of the product lifecycle, process innovation is more important in the later stages of 
production, when higher volumes have to be produced. The latter type of innovation may involve 
less patenting activities than the early stages. 
The  rest  of  the  article  proceeds  as  follows.  The  next  section  presents  a  brief  review  of  the 
literature, the theoretical framework and related hypotheses. The following section describes our 
research methodology, including data and regression models. The next section then presents the 
regression results. Finally, the last section presents a discussion of these findings and draws 
conclusions from the research. 
2.  Theoretical framework and hypothesis development 
2.1  Collaboration and contracting 
Collaboration  has  been  positively  linked  to  patent  propensity  by  a  number  of  authors.  The 
rationale is simple, before entering into any type of partnership, firms feel the need to protect 
their own intellectual property (IP) before the partner gains access to that precious knowledge. 
Patenting may also be the result of the collaborative agreement. Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999) 
find that R&D collaboration agreements have a positive effect on the probability of applying for 
a  patent.  In  their  study  of  Finland  and  Germany,  Czarnitzki  et  al.  (2007)  conclude  that 
collaboration leads to a better patenting performance of the economy in general.  
Greis et al. (1995) find that the frequency with which US firms have entered into collaborative 
agreements has increased dramatically since the 1970s (Hagedoorn and Shankenraad, 1990a, b) 
to overcome innovation barriers such as short-termism of capital markets and heavy regulatory 
process. The innovation process is now so intertwined that the locus of innovation (Pisano et al. 
1988) has shifted from the single firm towards a network or inter-organizational relationships. 
The paper is somewhat linked to the exploration-exploitation dichotomy (March, 1991) and the 
cycle of discovery of Nooteboom (2000). “Exploitation, i.e. the efficient employment of current 
assets and capabilities, is needed to survive in the short term. Exploration, i.e. the development   3 
of novel capabilities, is needed to survive in the long term. Thus, to survive in the short and long 
term, firms must combine the two, somehow.” (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2006, p. 3). Exploration 
hence is associated with “the pursuit of knowledge, of things that might come to be known”, and 
exploitation is related to “the use and development of things already known” (Levinthal and 
March, 1993, p. 105). The question is whether biotechnology small and medium firms (SMEs) in 
Canada follow this pattern or whether long-term survival is not the goal of this paper.  
Exploration activities may well result in the patenting of innovation, whether the collaboration 
agreement is with a firm or a public institution, but may also result in the development of new 
ideas,  published  in  academic  journals  if  the  biotech  firm  collaborates  with  a  university.  In 
contrast, firms that collaborate for exploitation purposes are more likely to do so with private 
enterprises rather than with public institutions. As a consequence, collaboration between firms 
for  exploration  purposes  is  likely  to  result  in  the  production  of  patented  knowledge,  while 
collaboration  between  firms  for  exploitation  purposes  is  likely  to  require  the  patenting  of 
innovation prior to its commercialisation. Our first hypothesis is therefore: 
H1: Firms that collaborate with private organisations have a greater propensity to patent 
Because some firms may contract out R&D instead of collaborating with other organisations, we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
H2: Firms that contract out R&D activities to other organisations have a lesser propensity to 
patent 
2.2  Private funding and public support 
Depending on the life cycle of the firm, various sources of funding are accessible to the firm. In 
the case of relatively young and small firms, angels and venture capital (VC) firms are often the 
first port of call. Controlling for R&D expenditures, Kortum and Lerner (2000) find that venture 
capital in the US has an important impact on the increase in patenting. They suggest that “a 
dollar of venture capital appears to be about three times more potent in stimulating patenting 
than  a  dollar  of  traditional  corporate  R&D”  (Kortum  and  Lerner,  2000,  p.675).  Engel  and 
Keilbach (2007) find similar results for Germany. An important nuance though is that the patents 
to which they refer are those for which the firm has applied prior to the involvement of venture 
capitalists. After the investment, the number of patent applications does not differ significantly   4 
from firms that were not funded by VC firms (Hellmann and Puri, 2000). This evidence suggests 
the following hypothesis: 
H3: Firms that benefit from angel funding and venture capital are more likely to patent 
Capital markets, venture capital and initial public offering (IPO) or the issuance of stock, are 
generally  focused  on  short-term  return  on  investment,  which  seems  far  removed  from  the 
realities of a domain where the regulatory process is long and cumbersome. Consequently, firms 
will be obliged to combine a number of sources of funding to go through the entire innovation 
process, from R&D to commercialisation (Hall and Bagchi-Sen, 2002).  
It is often assumed that debt financing is detrimental to innovation. This Schumpeterian view is 
based on the fact that “R&D cannot be used as collateral in credit negotiations with banks” 
(Czarnitzki and Kaft, 2009, p.376). R&D is an expense and its outcome is highly uncertain. As a 
consequence, banks are very reluctant to fund such endeavours (Hall, 2002). For these reasons, 
Gomper and Lerner (2001) state that banks are unable to adequately finance innovative firms, 
particularly  high-tech  firms.  Audretsch  and  Lehmann  (2004)  then  demonstrate  that  small 
innovative firms are more likely to be financed by venture capital than by banks. These findings 
suggest the following hypothesis: 
H4: Firms that receive funding from traditional banks tend to patent less 
If the cost of external funding is too high as Hall (2002) argues, some innovation will not be 
brought forward. Firms will simply abandon some projects and not devote the socially optimum 
amount towards R&D. To remedy this R&D sub-optimality and to provide an incentive to firms, 
Government intervention is therefore needed to help fill the gap between the private and social 
returns to innovation expenditures. Among the Government tools are direct funding, through 
grants and loans, and tax credits, mainly R&D tax credits. A number of studies have examined 
the impact of these tools (see for example the surveys by David, Hall and Pool, 2000; Hall and 
van Reenen, 2000). Relatively few have concentrated their analysis on Canadian firms. Bérubé 
and Mohnen (2009) examine whether firms that receive R&D subsidies are more innovative. 
They find that firms that benefit from both R&D grants and R&D tax credits introduce more new 
products than firms that only benefit from the latter. In the same vein, Czarnitzki et al. (2011) 
show that R&D tax credits lead to additional product innovations and increased shares of new or 
improved products.   5 
In a study of Belgian firms, Cincera (2005) find that while the impact of private (from firms) 
funding has a positive impact on the number of patent applications, the effect of government 
funding is not significant. Her argument for justifying these results is  that public support is 
generally  intended  for  long-term  fundamental  research  that  will  take  some  time  to  show  an 
impact on innovative output. As a consequence, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H5: Firms that receive direct public funding have higher propensity to patent 
3.  Methodology 
3.1  Data 
The  data  used  in  this  study  was  collected  by  Statistics  Canada.  The  responses  to  the  four 
Biotechnology Uses and Development (BUD) surveys
1 of 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005 have been 
linked  to  one  another  to  build  a  quasi -longitudinal  database.  Because  the  number  of 
biotechnology firms in Canada is relatively small, all firms involved in biotechnology are 
surveyed and completion of these questionnaires by the surveyed firms is a legal requirement 
under the Statistics Act. As a consequenc e, the obtained response rates are between 60% and 
70%. As such, Statistics Canada considers these surveys as a census of all biotechnology 
enterprises. Our sample is therefore representative of the population.  Table 1 summarizes the 
number of firms in each survey. In this paper, we will concentrate our analysis on the small and 
medium size enterprises (SMEs). 
The two right-hand columns indicate the number of individua l firms that are included in the 
quasi-longitudinal database resulting from the data linkage. In total, the data used in this paper 
includes 1004 firms from 1999 to 2005. In this joint sample, a number of firms have been added 
to the database over the years, either because they did not exist previously, or because they only 
converted to biotechnology recently, or simply because they did not answer the questionnaire in 
past years. In addition, a number of firms also leave the database because they cease thei r 
activities, are merged or acquired, or once again, did not answer the questionnaire. The quasi -
                                                 
1 Each BUD survey is carried out in two steps. A first questionnaire is sent to the Canadian enterprises that are 
potentially capable of using or developing biotechnology, in order to identify the reference population. For 
economic reasons, sampling generally reaches about a 70% response rate. The methodologists of Statistics Canada 
then apply non-response weights to the sample by strata (firm size, province and NAICS code). Then a second 
detailed questionnaire is sent to all firms of the reference population. The same procedure for the non-response 
correction is applied; the resulting weights are thus a combination of the two non-response weights, from the first 
and second questionnaire.    6 
longitudinal database thus constructed is a very unbalanced panel. For instance, some firms may 
have  answered  the  4  questionnaires,  some  only  one  questionnaire,  while  others  may  have 
responded to one questionnaire in 2001 and to another in 2005. Considering our sample, proper 
panel data analysis is not feasible. 
Table 1 – Number of firms by size and sector, per survey year 
  1999  2001  2003  2005  1999-2005  2001-2005 
Size             
Small  269  267  352  397     
Medium  51  62  77  83     
SMEs  320  329  429  480  1004  810 
Large  37  47  61  52     
             
Sector             
Human health  150  197  262  310     
Agriculture and food processing  118  113  137  146     
Environment  35  33  38  39     
Other  54  32  52  37     
             
Total  358  375  490  532  1129  907 
Note: For individual surveys are presented the weighted number of firms using the non-response weights. For the 
two right-hand columns, the number of firms is not weighted and indicates the size of the sample. Because the four 
surveys were not originally planed as a longitudinal study, non-response weights for an individual firm across time 
cannot sensibly be constructed a posteriori. 
 
The phenomenon of interest is whether firms have innovated in the past two years. More than 
half  of  the  firms  have  filed  patent  applications  within  the  last  two  years  of  the  survey  (for 
example, the 2005 survey comprises the patent applications of both 2004 and 2005).  
Our dependent variable, PatApp, indicates if firms have applied for a patent in the past two 
years. A second dependent variable, nbPatApp, measures the number of patent applications filed 
by the firm in the past two years.  
3.2  Variables 
Firms  may  develop  new  innovations  in-house,  in  collaboration  with  other  organisations  or 
simply by contracting out this task. In the first case, internal R&D is the main driver of new 
innovations that will eventually be patented. In the second case, both internal and external R&D 
are required. Finally, in the third case, external R&D yields the innovations that the firm requires   7 
or has contracted out. Our first two variables on external linkages of the firm are related to the 
collaboration and contracting activities of the firm. 
In  the  database  available  for  this  study,  most  firms  that  collaborate  do  so  for  exploration 
purposes, i.e. for the development of knowledge, it is therefore difficult to disentangle the effect 
of public and private collaboration because both types are equally present. In contrast, firms that 
collaborate for exploitation purposes are more likely to do so with private enterprises rather than 
with  public institutions. Exploration in  our case would be represented by  collaboration with 
academia. When collaborating with a university, a firm is generally seeking the development of 
knowledge, a patent may be the result, but it is not necessarily an automatic result. Indeed, when 
firms  collaborate  for  exploration  purposes,  patents  and  papers  may  be  the  results  of  this 
endeavour. In contrast, when collaborating with other firms, exploitation would be related to 
collaboration with large pharmaceutical firms and aimed at commercialisation. To measure the 
extent to which a firm collaborates with other firms, we include the number of collaborative 
arrangements that a firm has reported for the year of the survey, nbCollPriv
2.  
For some aspects of the research, a firm might not have the necessary knowledge, know-how or 
capacity in-house and might want to contract out some of these activities
3. Generally, the IP 
generated by the firm contracted to do the work would be expected to belong to the firm that 
gives the contract. Unless other arrangements (such licensing at a reduced fee or share IP) are 
made for the IP, we would expect contracting out to have a positive effect on innovation. For this 
purpose, we include CostContOut, which measures the cost of the contracts granted by the firm 
to other organizations
4. 
                                                 
2 The dummy version of this variable is also included in the analysis as dCollPriv. The number of collaborative 
arrangements is not available in the 1999 survey, only whether the firm had collaborative arrangements with various 
types of partners.  
3 The survey questionnaire provide a clear definition of cooperative and collaborative arrangements: “Cooperative 
and collaborative arrangements involve the active participation in projects between your company and other 
companies or organizations in order to develop and/or continue work on new or significantly improved 
biotechnology processes, products and/or services. Pure contracting-out work is not regarded as collaboration.” This 
distinction allows us to also include in the analysis contracting activities as an alternative means by which firms 
acquire knowledge. 
4 The most recent survey questionnaires ask the firm to distinguish the total value of contracts by type or 
organization as well as by the objective of the contract in a matrix format. Because of the complexity of the answers 
demanded and considering the small proportion of firms that have filled the matrix we will not make use of this rich 
information. In addition, the matrix to be filled is not identical from one survey to the next, rendering a detailed 
analysis difficult if at all possible. At the aggregate level, there are less risks of mismeasurement, a firm knows how 
much it has spent on contracts in total.   8 
The second group of variables of interest is related to the private funding and public support of 
biotechnology  firms.  As  an  alternative  to  revenues  in  their  early  life,  firms  are  strongly 
dependent  on  external  funding.  The  four  surveys  asked  the  firms  whether  they  successfully 
managed to raise capital, how much they raised and what proportion came from each source of 
funds. With that information, we construct four funding variables, FundGov, which measures the 
total amount of direct funding received from government sources, FundVC, represents the total 
amount of venture capital received, regardless of its geographical origin
5, FundAng, measures 
the amount of funds received from family and other providential investors (angels), and finally 
FundDebt,  represents  the  amount  borrowed  by  the  firm.  Because  venture  capital  and  angel 
funding  are  the  very  first  doors  on  which  to  knock,  these  should  have  a  positive  effect  on 
patenting. 
In addition to the variables of interest, we include a number of control variables, which all have 
their importance individually. The size and age of the firm have been studied in great length in 
the  past.  In  addition,  we  add  the  basic  characteristics  of  the  firm,  the  stage  of  its  product 
development, its  IP related strategies, the revenues generated from the firm in addition to a 
number of sector, time-related and environment dummy variables. These are described in the 
paragraphs below. 
Brouwer  and  Kleinknecht  (1999)  find  that  larger  firms  have  a  greater  propensity  to  patent. 
Arundel et al. (1995) suggest that patents are more important for small firms because they are at 
a disadvantage regarding other protection mechanisms compared to large firms. Other studies 
however refute this argument by showing that the importance of patents increases with the size 
of the firm (Arundel, 2001; Kortum and Lerner, 1999; Hussinger, 2006). These studies include 
large firms in their analysis. In this paper, we concentrate our analysis on small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). The question is then whether this finding still stands without the larger 
firms included in the sample and within a very specific technology field, i.e. biotechnology. 
Owen-Smith and Powell (2004) include both the size of the firm and its age as control variables 
in  their  analysis  of  the  factors  that  affect  successful  patent  applications  in  the  Boston 
Biotechnology industry. They find an inverted-U relationship for the age of the firm. Once again, 
                                                 
5 The more recent surveys distinguish venture capital from Canadian, European, American and other sources. 
Because this reporting is not consistent through out the surveys and mainly because the distinction between the 
sources did not provide robust results, the aggregated values are used in this paper.   9 
their sample also includes the large enterprises, which are generally older than SMEs and small 
firms.  
As an alternative to the typical number of employees of the firm, we have access to the number 
of employees dedicated to biotechnology (from research to IP management, from marketing to 
operations management), nbEmpBio. This variable proved much more significant than the total 
number of employees of the firm and will thus be used in this paper as a measure of the size of 
biotechnology activities. 
To account for the fact that a more complete managing team helps the firm obtain better sales 
results which then contribute to financing R&D (Woiceshyn and Hartel, 1996), or for the fact 
that the lack of employees in marketing functions is a barrier to innovation (Hall and Bagchi-
Sen, 2002), we include a measure of diversity of biotechnology employment (research, including 
lab directors and technicians, regulation and clinical trials, production, finances and marketing, 
general management). A simple Hirshman-Herfindahl index, HHIEmpBio, based on the share of 
these five employment tasks is constructed. The closer to 1 is the index, the less diverse and 
levelled is the team, the closer to 0, the more one category of employee dominates.  
As independent additional control variables, we include the usual controls for the age of the firm, 
Age. A dummy variable, dPub, is included which takes the value 1 if the firm is a public firm. A 
second  dummy  variable,  dMerg,  takes  the  value  1  if  has  merged  or  been  acquired.  A  third 
dummy  variable,  dSubsInt,  takes  the  value  1  if  the  firm  is  a  subsidiary  of  an  international 
company. Finally, a fourth dummy variable, dSpinoff takes the value 1 if the firm is a spinoff, 
whether it emerged from a public institution or a private enterprise
6.  
For the collaborative arrangements to be beneficial to the firm, its research team must be able to 
perform its own R&D activities, to have knowledge to transmit to other organizations, but also 
for its own absorptive c apacity  (Cohen and Levinthal, 19 90). We therefore include  RDExp, 
which measures the amount spent in R&D by the firm.  
A somewhat  related variable is  whether the firm  has  put in  place  specific strategies for the 
protection of the intellectual property. These strategies would have a definite positive impact on 
patenting because of the very nature of the domain. In the questionnaires, the firms rated the 
                                                 
6 Distinctions between the types of spinoffs where examined during the course of this study, but no significant 
effects were ever noted. A simpler version of the dummy variable is thus presented in this paper.   10 
importance of knowledge development strategies on their firm‟s performance on a 5-point lickert 
scale from a low importance (1) to a high importance (5). Two items in the survey relate to IP: 
Developed  firm  policies  and  practices  for  knowledge/intellectual  property  protection;  and 
Conducted an intellectual property audit to ensure protection of products and processes at all 
stages of development. We construct a variable, StratIP, with the mean score for these questions 
to generate a measure of the importance of IP protection in the firm
7.  
One question that springs to mind is whether the business model of some biotechnology firms is 
not simply that of the one -product firm, i.e.  based on one product brought to the market or 
brought to phase II of the clinical trials followed by the traditional venture capitalist exit strategy 
(IPO or acquisition by a another firm). These particular firms would thus file for patents early in 
their life and then follow the product through the pipeline , while neglecting further research or 
patenting. As  a consequence, patenting would strongly depend on the stage of the product 
pipeline that the firm has reached. To account for this possibility, we have constructed a variable 
that  takes  into  consideration  the  proportion  of  the  products  that  are  at  various   stages  of 
development, from R&D, to the preclinical phase and the clinical trials (all three phases), 
followed by production and commercialization of the products. The resulting ordered variable, 
ProdStage, takes the value 1 if the highest proportion of the products is at the R&D stage, the 
value 2 if the highest proportion of the products is at the preclinical stage, the value 3 if the 
highest proportion of the products is at the regulation and clinical trials stage, and the value 4 if 
the highest proportion of the products is in production or on the market
8. 
In addition to public funding, venture capital and debt financing, a firm may well have to resort 
to research contracting to be able to maintain operations (Hall and Bagchi -Sen, 2002). The 
authors find that contract or collaboration revenue represented 17% of all the revenue sources of 
Canadian biotechnology firms in 1998. In order to finance the laboratories while waiting for the 
patenting process to takes its course or for the research to reach its goal, some firms subcontract, 
so to speak, their research facilities. This is a common survival strategy in the field, which allows 
the firm more time to devote to research or further testing.  Such activities would then be 
                                                 
7 The Cronbach alpha of the two components of StratIP is 0.7660, which show a good level of reliability. 
8 During the course of the analysis, we have tested whether the number of products at each stage of development 
(and taking the natural logarithm), or the proportion of products at each stage of development had a more significant 
effect. These variables did not however yield robust results and increased the number of regressions with a great 
improvement on the explanatory power of the regressions.   11 
associated with intellectual property that belongs to other organizations and would thus have a 
negative effect on innovation of the firm in question. We measure the revenues from contracting 
in research activities, RevContIn, rather than the number of contracts, which may not reflect 
accurately the extent of the contracting activities.  
Another important source of revenues in this strongly science-based domain is the licensing fees 
obtained from leasing, licensing or selling IP to other organizations. For firms that have a strong 
tradition  of  patenting,  this  represents  a  potentially  high  source  of  revenues,  which  would 
generally be associated with a positive effect on patenting. Once again, the value of licensing, 
RevIPR, is more appropriate than say the number of such licenses as it represents the „quality‟ or 
usefulness of the innovation. We also include in the analysis the number of patents owned by the 
firm, nbPat, as a measure of innovation capability. These are the result of patent applications in 
the past that are the consequence of R&D performed a few years back. The IP that does not have 
direct uses for the firm might as well be used by another organization while providing extra 
revenues to finance the firm‟s activities.  
Once we have accounted for the revenues from contracting in and from IP licensing, revenues 
from  sales  are  what  most  firms  aspire  to.  The  survey  provides  information  from  total  sales 
revenues  as  well  as  from  exports  revenues.  We  have  examined  various  ways  of  including 
domestic sales and exportations within the analyses, unfortunately, the distinction did not yield 
significant results. As a consequence, we include in the regressions the total sales revenues, 
RevSales, and a dummy variable, dExport, taking the value 1 if the firm has exported products 
within the past two years of the survey. 
Finally,  our  model  will  include  subdomain  dummy  variables,  for  human  health,  agriculture 
biotech, environment, and other subdomains, to take into account for subdomain heterogeneity 
that may not be picked up by other variables, as well as regional dummy variables for provinces 
and survey-year dummy variables to account for variations in the economic environment across 
provinces and across time that may affect the firms.    12 
3.3  Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for SMEs for the most complete sample
9. The variables 
for which the number of observations N is equal to 811 are not present in the 1999 survey. More 
than 50% of firms submitted patent applications during the two years covered by each survey for 
an average 4.7 applications per firm, including those that did not patent. On a 5 -point Likert 
scale, firms score an average 3.2 for the importance of an IP strategy, which seems relatively low 
for a domain for which patents are almost perfectly suited. 
The average firm is 10 years old, has 26 employees of which 17 are dedicated to biotechnology 
activities. Not surprisingly, the distribution of the type of tasks performed by these employees is 
highly  skewed  towards  research  as  indicated  by  the  high  value  of  HHIEmpBio  and  of 
nbEmpRes. More than 40% of firms are spinoffs, 22% have reached their first initial public offer 
(IPO) stage, 13% have been merged and 11% are subsidiaries of foreign organisations. 
In the variables used to calculate the stage of product development of the firm, i.e. the number of 
products in R&D (nbProdRD), preclinical (nbProdPC) and clinical (nbProdRC) stages as well as 
on the market (nbProdPM), we find that the first and last have the most weight. On average, 
firms have 22 products in the lab and 15 products on the market, which yield an average 
advancement stage of 3, roughly equivalent to the „clinical research‟ stage. 
More than 55% of firms collaborate with other organisations, 32% with private firms and 31% 
with  public  institutions.  On  average,  firms  participate  in  1.24  collaborative  agreements  with 
private firms and in 0.84 such agreements with public institutions. 
R&D expenditures are by far the largest expense, compared to the costs of contracting out and of 
acquiring IP. Part of these costs are compensated by R&D tax credits which compensate for less 
than a quarter of R&D expenditures on average. Part of these expenditures is obviously paid for 
by  generous  amounts  of  venture  capital,  and  apparently  from  rather  well  off  angels.  Note 
however the large standard error of this last variable.  
                                                 
9 It is important to note that the means presented here do not take into account that the same firms may have 
responded to more than one survey. What is calculated here are the means of the characteristics of firm-year 
combinations. For instance, a firm that became a public firm in 2003 would count as a non public firm for 1999 and 
2001 and as a public firm in 2003 and 2005.   13 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics 
Variable  N  Mean  S.E.  Without the natural log 
dAllColl  1005  0.5562  (0.0157)     
dCollPriv  1005  0.3174  (0.0147)     
dCollPub  1005  0.3114  (0.0146)     
nbAllColl  1005  2.0559  (0.1629)     
nbCollPriv  811  1.2377  (0.1603)     
nbCollPub  811  0.8426  (0.0740)     
nbEmpRes  1005  10.3967  (0.4075)     
nbEmpReg  1005  1.0348  (0.0928)     
nbEmpMngt  1005  1.7446  (0.1001)     
nbEmp  1005  26.2256  (0.9188)     
nbEmpBio  1005  17.0947  (0.6793)     
HHIEmpBio  1001  0.7359  (0.0232)     
Age  811  10.0814  (0.4151)     
dPub  811  0.2182  (0.0145)     
dMerg  811  0.1282  (0.0117)     
dSubsInt  811  0.1097  (0.0110)     
dSpinoff  1005  0.4030  (0.0155)     
ln(RDExp)  1005  6.2803  (0.0662)  2,804,132  (270,286) 
nbPat  1005  6.9241  (0.7576)     
nbPatApp  1005  4.6990  (0.5031)     
StratKnow  811  3.2022  (0.0350)     
StratIP  811  3.1973  (0.0436)     
nbProdRD  1005  21.8470  (7.6095)     
nbProdPC  1005  1.7787  (0.3214)     
nbProdRC  1005  2.6768  (1.1693)     
nbProdPM  1005  15.4642  (4.9632)     
ProdStage  1005  3.0229  (0.0271)     
ln(CostContOut)  1005  2.9542  (0.0979)  1,375,539  (574,418) 
ln(CostIPR)  811  0.6872  (0.0638)  234,775  (131,417) 
ln(RevContIn)  811  1.3514  (0.0912)  372,834  (77,492) 
ln(RevIPR)  811  0.4715  (0.0579)  129,676  (49,021) 
ln(RevSales)  811  4.8427  (0.1243)     
ln(Rev)  1005  5.3289  (0.1195)     
dExport  1005  0.2995  (0.0145)     
ln(FundGov)  1005  0.8997  (0.0940)  10,873,950  (2,424,651) 
ln(FundVC)  1005  1.9692  (0.1449)  107,527,100  (14,180,310) 
ln(FundDebt)  1005  0.5754  (0.0776)  7,434,544  (2,133,823) 
ln(FundAng)  1005  1.0801  (0.1031)  89,151,290  (79,927,910) 
dFiscInc  1005  0.7881  (0.0129)     
ln(FiscInc)  811  4.2301  (0.0952)  597,224  (56,436) 
Note: All monetary values are in constant dollars of 2002 (deflated by the CPI). 
 
3.4  Model specification 
Our first model, examines the propensity of firms to file patent applications. The basic equation 
on PatApp to be estimated includes the following set of independent variables:   14 

















  (1) 
A firm that invests in R&D is also likely to have a policy for the protection of the IP generated 
by this R&D, and may also contract out some of this R&D to other organizations for the tasks for 
which the firm does not have the capacity. Because of complementarity, these three variables are 
likely  to  be  endogenous.  To  overcome  this  endogeneity  problem,  we  use  an  instrumental 
variables  estimation  technique.  We  regress  these  variables  on  a  set  of  assumed  exogenous 
variables or instruments in a first step. Then, we use the predicted values of these variables as 
independent variables in the estimation of equation (1). The Stata procedure ivprobit allows for 
the second stage standard errors to be consistent. Each of the endogenous variables is estimated 
on a number of instruments.  
As specific instruments for R&D expenditures, we use the number of employees dedicated to 
research (including lab directors and technicians), nbEmpRes, which will represent an important 
part  of  these  expenditures,  FiscInc.  We  also  include  the  amount  of  the  fiscal  incentives 
associated with these R&D expenditures
10. Similarly to what Veugelers and Cassiman (2005) use 
in their regressions, we calculate an average value for each of the sub-domains of biotechnology, 
RDExpSD
11. This sub-domain average is expected to account for any unobserved heterogeneity 
that might arise from the different realities of each sub-domain.  
  RDExp= nbEmpres,FiscInc,RDExpSD { }  (2) 
When instrumenting for StratPI, we include the mean score of three other strategies related to 
knowledge development, StratKnow. The questionnaire asks the firm to rank the importance of 
the following items: Captured and used knowledge obtained from other industry sources such as 
industry associations, competitors, clients and suppliers; Captured and used knowledge obtained 
from public research institutions including universities and government laboratories; Used and 
                                                 
10 Generally, the vast majority of firms in biotechnology are innovative; this is the name of the game. As a 
consequence, we expect that the possible selection bias resulting from firms demanding R&D tax credits or grants is 
relatively small. We will therefore ignore for this paper, the potential selection bias. 
11 The sub-domains are: human health, agriculture biotechnology, food processing, environment, natural resources, 
aquaculture and bioinformatics.   15 
updated databases of scientific information
12. These questions relate to the capacity of the firm to 
turn into new knowledge, products or processes, the information obtained from other sources, 
private organizations, public institutions or basic science.  If the firm  aims to develop new 
intellectual property, it is hence more likely to want to protect it. We also include the number of 
employees dedicated to regulatory activities as an instrument, nbEmpReg. The more important is 
the protection of IP, the greater the need for such employees. This variable hence measures the 
capacity of the firm to protect its IP. Similarly to the previous endogenous variable, we also 
consider the sub-domain average of the instrumented variable, StratIPSD.  
  StratIP= StratKnow,nbEmpreg,StratIPSD { }   (3) 
Finally,  the  third  endogenous  variable,  CostContOut,  is  instrumented  by  the  number  of 
collaborative agreements the firm has with public institutions, nbCollPub, the costs of the IP 
rights purchased or licensed from other organisations, CostIPR and the number of employees 
dedicated  to  management,  nbEmpMngt.  Firms  that  contract  out  research  are  more  likely  to 
benefit from collaboration with universities and government laboratories. This can lead to, or 
emanate from, contracting out research activities to these institutions. In contracting out research 
activities, the resulting IP may not necessarily belong entirely to the firm, or may also require the 
purchase of IP rights developed by the contractee, in which case, the costs of acquiring IP rights 
are likely to be related to the costs of contracting out. The coordination of external research 
activities makes extra managerial demands on the firm, hence the inclusion of the number of 
biotechnology employees dedicated to management. Negotiation of contracts as well as their 
subsequent monitoring are demanding tasks that if neglected may result in the failure of the 
partnership. 
  CostContOut = nbCollPub,CostIPR,nbEmpMngt { }   (4) 
4.  Regression results 
Table 3 presents the results from the probit regressions on PatApp for the SME sample excluding 
the 1999 survey. The regressions were therefore estimated on a sample of 811 observations 
corresponding to 528 firms covering the 2001, 2003 and 2005 surveys. The results including the 
                                                 
12 The Cronbach alpha of these three variables is 0.6626, which is acceptable for an exploratory study.   16 
1999  survey  are  provided  in  appendix  3.  Regression  (1)  shows  the  results  for  the  model 
excluding the three endogenous variables. 
The  number  of  collaborative  agreements  with  private  firms  has  a  positive,  nbCollPriv,  but 
weakly  significant  impact  on  PatApp.  As  expected,  collaboration  hence  does  matter  for 
innovation in this high technology domain, a result similar to that of Brouwer and Kleinknecht 
(1999). During the analysis, we have tried to add non linear effects, i.e. a quadratic term, for this 
variable as suggested by Deeds and Hill (1996) who showed that the relationship between the 
number  of  collaborative  agreements  and  innovation  performance  suffers  from  diminishing 
marginal returns. This however did not improve the significance of the variable. In its dummy 
variable  format,  collaborative  agreements  with  private  firms  yield  a  positive  and  highly 
significant coefficient for the regressions including the 1999 cohort (in appendix 3).  
Funding  sources  associated  with  the  early  beginnings  of  a  firm,  i.e.,  angels  and  venture 
capitalists (FundAng, FundVC), both have a positive effect on the propensity of a firm to file 
patent applications. Angel funding has a much more robust impact than venture capital on the 
propensity to patent. This should not be surprising; during the early days of the firm, when most 
spinoffs  and  newly  founded  firms  are  seeking  financing  for  their  research  endeavours,  seed 
capital is just about the only source available. Other sources of funding have no effect, in this 
first regression. The same results are found when we include the 1999 cohort (see appendix 3). 
The „biotech‟ size of the firm, nbEMPBio, has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood 
of  filing  a  patent  application,  hence  supporting  the  finding  of  Arundel  (2001),  Kortum  and 
Lerner (1999) and Hussinger (2006). The diversity of employment, HHIEmpBio, within the firm 
does not however have any impact on the propensity to file patent applications. This result is 
attributable  to  the  fact  that  research  employment  clearly  dominates  and  that  the  standard 
deviation of this variable is very small. Alternative methods have to be investigated to find an 
appropriate measure of the fact that a firm has a complete team. 
Not surprisingly, spinoffs do have a positive and highly significant effect on the propensity to 
file patent applications, regardless of their origin. The common scenario in this domain is that 
university scientists generally patent their findings through the creation of new firms. In addition, 
if a firm has patented before and has a portfolio of patents it is highly probable that it will patent   17 
again. This result seems to suggest that firms are generally not one-patent firms that aim to 
commercialise one product. 
The results however show that the further along the commercialisation path the firm is, the less 
likely it is to apply for a patent, i.e., ProdStage has a negative and significant effect. A related 
variable  is  the  revenues  generated  from  sales,  RevSales,  which  also  yields  a  negative  and 
significant effect on PatApp. Firms that already have sales revenues are generally further in the 
life cycle of the enterprise. This is also found in the regressions including the 1999 cohort, as the 
total amount of revenues has a negative and significant impact on the propensity to patent (see 
appendix 3). We would have expected that a firm that already exports has also reached a certain 
maturity. The coefficient of dExport is however not significant. Two effects may be at play here. 
First, for some firms, exportation is the ultimate goal and once they have reached it, they receive 
steady revenues from selling their products abroad. For some other firms, the fact of exporting 
products is a means by which they can generate revenues to finance the development of their 
main product.  
An  important  survival  strategy  in  biotech  consists  in  performing  contract  work  for  other 
organisations in order to use and maintain laboratories facilities and staff. A consequence of this 
strategy is that firms hence patent less, presumably because the IP developed belongs to the 
contractor organisation. The revenues generated by these contracts, RevContIn, have a negative 
and significant effect on the propensity to patent. In contrast, IP revenues have a weakly positive 
effect on the propensity to patent.  
In the next three regressions, (2), (3) and (4), we introduce in turn, the three variables that are 
instrumented in regressions (5), (6) and (7). Regression (2) introduces RDExp as a measure of 
the input necessary to generate patentable innovations. Confirming prior studies, R&D positively 
influences the likelihood that a firm will patent. The „biotech‟ size of the firm, nbEmpBio, loses 
its impact on the propensity to patent, and so does the stage of advancement of the products of 
the  firm,  ProdStage,  and  the  amount  raised  from  venture  capital,  FundVC.  This  suggest  an 
interaction  between these  three  variables and R&D.  First,  the amount  of R&D expenditures 
depend on the size of the firm to some extent, especially for high technology SMEs. Second, the 
source of funding that is the most appropriate when the firm is still largely in its research phase is 
venture capital, hence the reduction in the value of the coefficient and its significance. Third,   18 
firms  spending a great  deal  on R&D are most probably in  the early stages  of their product 
lifecycle,  which  contributes  the  explaining  the  increase  in  the  value  of  the  coefficient  (less 
negative) and the loss of significance of ProdStage.  
When correcting for potential endogeneity (5), RDExp remains positive and strongly significant, 
but its coefficient almost doubles in value. Two of the instruments of RDExp are significant (as 
seen in Appendix 2), nbEmpres and FiscInc. In other words, firms who employ more research 
personnel dedicated to biotech spend more on R&D expenditures and benefit from larger R&D 
tax credits, i.e. fiscal incentives. The subdomain average of R&D does contribute to explaining 
the variations observed for RDExp. In retrospect, this is not surprising as we are after all studying 
a science-based domain and not comparing a number of industrial sectors across the economy as 
most studies that use industrial averages do. It is therefore expected that the costs and intensity of 
R&D  are  relatively  similar  across  all  subdomains  of  biotechnology.  With  the  exception  of 
dSpinoff,  which  loses  its  significance  in  the  endogeneity-corrected  regression,  the  other 
coefficients remain relatively similar between regressions (2) and (5). 
Regression (3) adds the IP strategies to the regression. The logic is simple, if a firm has a clear 
strategy towards the protection of its IP, then it is more likely to patent. This is what the results 
indeed  show.  In  addition,  this  regression  does  not  change  much  of  the  results  obtained  in 
regression  (1),  with  the  exception  of  the  revenues  obtained  from  contracts  which  looses  its 
significance. 
Controlling  for  potential  endogeneity  yields  a  positive  but  weakly  significant  coefficient  for 
StratIP in regression (6). That being said, the Wald test does not reject the null hypothesis that 
there is no endogeneity. It is nevertheless interesting to comment on the potential instruments for 
StratIP.  The  first  stage  regression  (in  Appendix  2)  presents  significant  results  for  the  three 
instruments of this variable. A firm‟s strategy towards knowledge development has a positive 
and strongly significant effect on having also a clear IP strategy. In this case, the subdomain 
average,  StratIPSD,  contributes  to  explaining  the  propensity  to  having  an  IP  strategy,  the 
coefficient  is  positive  and  strongly  significant.  Surprisingly,  however,  the  coefficient  on  the 
number of employees dedicated to biotech regulation, nbEmpReg, has a negative but weakly 
significant impact on IP strategy. We would have expected the opposite, as any strategy requires 
employees to implement it.    19 
Table 3 – Probit regression results for PatApp – SMEs excluding the 1999 survey 
SMEs without 1999  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)    (7)   










































  ln(FundVC)  0.0289 **  0.0165 
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  nbEmpBio  0.0083 **  0.0020 
 
0.0084 ***  0.0074 **  -0.0037 
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  dSpinoff  0.2948 ***  0.2580 **  0.2412 **  0.2462 **  0.1763 
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  Notes:  ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
LL = Log Pseudolikelihood.   20 
The last potentially endogenous variable to be considered is the cost related to contracting out 
research activities, CostContOut. If a firm contracts out research activities, it may want to retain 
ownership of the IP developed outside the firm. In addition, because it is sometimes difficult to 
clearly identify the boundaries between what is the IP of the firm and what is being contracted 
out, or because part of the IP of the firm has to be „leaked‟ to the contractee in order to ensure 
that  the  contract  work  is  successful  and  that  the  firm  can  appropriate  the  results  within  its 
processes, a firm is more likely to want to protect its IP from potential unwanted spillovers 
towards the contractee. Once again, there are no notable variations between regressions (1) and 
(4).  
Examining now what happens if we control for endogeneity, we find that CostContOut loses its 
significance in regression (7). Contracting out research activities does not seem to affect the 
decision to apply for a patent, once we control for endogeneity. Similarly to regression (6), the 
Wald test  for exogeneity  is  not  significant and  implies  that regression (4) is  probably more 
appropriate.  We  will  nevertheless  comment  on  the  first  stage  regression,  as  the  results  are 
interesting. We find that the number of collaborative agreements with public institutions has a 
positive impact on the decision to contract out research activities. Two phenomena may be at 
play here. First, collaborating firms are generally more open to external research activities and 
are therefore more likely to enter into formal contracting agreements with partners. Second, we 
suspect that although the questionnaire specifically stipulates that collaborative agreements are 
not contracts, firms may misinterpret or confuse the two. Very rarely, firms will collaborate with 
universities without there being a formal contract, whether financial or regarding the ownership 
and transfer of IP rights. As such, collaboration with university may appear as both contracts and 
collaborative  agreements.  We  therefore  suspect  that  measurement  error  is  enhancing  the 
significance of this variable. If firms collaborate, they have to acquire IP rights of the partner in 
order to be able to use the research results. This variable has a positive effect on the decision to 
contract  out,  but  it  is  weakly  significant.  Surprisingly,  the  increasing  number  of  biotech 
management  employees  that  would  be  needed  to  put  in  place  and  monitor  such  contracting 
arrangements is not significant. Again, two phenomena may be influencing this result. First, the 
management of contracts may be part of a firm-based strategy and would thus not be part of the 
biotech management team. Second, firms may well neglect to recruit for various reasons, lack of 
funds  being  the  obvious  one,  the  necessary  staff  to  supervise  contracts  and  collaborative   21 
activities as well. This may contribute to their demise, but that is another story that we do not 
address in this paper.  
5.  Discussion and conclusion 
This paper studies which firms are more likely to be patenting their innovations. We build an 
econometric  model  of  the  firm  characteristics  associated  with  the  propensity  to  file  patent 
applications using the four Biotechnology uses and development surveys that Statistics Canada 
conducted in 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005. Merging the four surveys into one database allows the 
construction of a quasi-longitudinal analysis of the data.  
Earlier in the paper we set out to validate five hypotheses related to external linkages and to the 
funding of innovation. Our results show that firms that collaborate with other firms have a higher 
propensity to patent, hence validating our first hypothesis (H1). Contrarily to our expectations, 
however, firms which contract out R&D activities also have a higher likelihood of patenting, 
hence refuting hypothesis H2. Our intuition was that contracting out reduces absorptive capacity 
of the firm, which then in turn reduces its capacity to patent. The data available does not allows 
the distinction between the provenance of patents, whether they were contracted out or whether 
they originated from the firm‟s own R&D.  
Three hypotheses were  formulated  relating to  private funding and public support of biotech 
firms. By and large, we find support for only one of the hypotheses proposed. Angel funding and 
venture capital do have a positive effect on the propensity of a firm to patent (H3), but public 
direct funding (H5), when its effect is significant, it is negative. In contrast, debt financing is not 
detrimental (H4) to the firm as its effect is never significant. To generate patents, a firm needs to 
raise funds from venture capital and angels. When we take into account the influence of R&D 
expenditures, however, the importance of venture capital disappears, even when we instrument 
for R&D expenditures.  
It is also interesting to report some of the results on the control variables. Our results generally 
suggest that size has a positive influence on the propensity to patent. This is supported by the 
literature that generally includes large firms in their sample. Our research shows that this result 
still  holds  for  SMEs  and  for  a  particular  category  of  employees,  those  dedicated  to 
biotechnology. Out of the basic characteristics of the firm, the fact of being a spinoff has the   22 
most  significant  effect  on  the  likelihood  that  a  firm  files  patent  applications.  A  history  of 
patenting also has a positive effect on the propensity to patent. On the one hand, this result 
disproves the intuition that the prime aim of biotechnology firms, especially spinoffs, is to bring 
the product for which the firm was created to the market, either via an IPO, the sale of the IPR or 
commercialisation. On the other hand, once a firm has the majority of its products in production 
or on the market, or that it generates more sales revenues, its propensity to patent decreases 
considerably, hence going against the previous argument.  
There  are  important  limitations  to  this  study.  First,  the  four  surveys  were  not  planned  as  a 
longitudinal study, which limits our ability to follow the firms through their life cycle and the life 
cycle of their products. This is a domain where it can take 10 years to bring a particular drug to 
the market. Second, there are important holes in the database due to the non-response of firms 
from one survey to the next. It is imperative that in such high technology domains, where the 
time-to-market are extremely long, think for instance of genomics where it is expected that 15 
years will be the norm, systematic longitudinal studies are put in place to be able to investigate 
the long term impact of public policies, such as R&D tax credits, direct grants, etc. In addition, 
our analysis has not managed to completely deal with the potential endogeneity, particularly that 
caused by R&D expenditures. Part of the endogeneity could be solved by lagged variables, but in 
the current dataset this reduces the sample of firms considerably. More research is needed to find 
the appropriate specification that would completely correct the endogeneity problems.  
     23 
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Appendix 1 Correlation matrix 
Variable     1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
dAllColl  1  1 
                          dCollPriv  2  0.6091*  1 
                        dCollPub  3  0.6007*  0.2661*  1 
                      nbAllColl  4  0.3559*  0.3808*  0.3908*  1 
                    nbCollPriv  5  0.2547*  0.3905*  0.1919*  0.9341*  1 
                  nbCollPub  6  0.3754*  0.1746*  0.6471*  0.6346*  0.3169*  1 
                nbEmpRes  7  0.1474*  0.1387*  0.0769*  0.1645*  0.1567*  0.0894*  1 
              nbEmpReg  8  0.0358  0.0785*  0.0417  0.0911*  0.0869*  0.0892*  0.3860*  1 
            nbEmpMngt  9  0.1116*  0.0522  0.0751*  0.0701*  0.0578  0.0730*  0.4524*  0.4946*  1 
          nbEmpBio  10  0.1083*  0.1032*  0.0699*  0.1655*  0.1473*  0.1441*  0.8141*  0.6296*  0.6668*  1 
        HHIEmpBio  11  0.0339  0.0037  -0.0059  -0.0210  -0.0568  -0.1121*  -0.0238 -0.0950* -0.0912* -0.1537*  1 
      Age  12  -0.0444  -0.0917*  -0.0381  -0.0202  -0.0066  -0.0395  -0.0410  0.0232  -0.0200  0.0047  0.0383  1 
    dPub  13  0.1193*  0.0916*  0.0608  0.0666  0.0502  0.0682  0.2166*  0.2003*  0.2676*  0.2402* -0.1442*  0.0446  1 
  dMerg  14  0.0645  0.0090  0.0435  -0.0101  -0.0064  -0.0129  0.0731*  0.0686  0.0686  0.0846* -0.0908*  0.1331*  0.2348*  1 
dSubsInt  15  -0.0419  -0.0419  -0.0492  -0.0360  -0.0287  -0.0337  0.0541  0.0990*  -0.0073  0.1054*  0.0176  0.2397*  -0.0136 0.1957* 
dSpinoff  16  0.1541*  0.1283*  0.0826*  0.0914*  0.0706*  0.1047*  0.1021*  -0.0132  -0.0187  0.0054  -0.0078 -0.2472*  -0.0004 -0.0012 
ln(RDExp)  17  0.2041*  0.1445*  0.1121*  0.1450*  0.1211*  0.1332*  0.5192*  0.3125*  0.3140*  0.4666*  -0.0425 -0.1496*  0.3310* 0.1439* 
nbPat  18  0.1245*  0.1132*  0.0749*  0.0734*  0.0577  0.0622  0.2810*  0.1013*  0.1388*  0.2225*  -0.0081  -0.0398  0.1202*  0.0602 
StratKnow  19  0.1549*  0.1230*  0.1273*  0.0036  -0.0173  0.0469  0.1001*  0.0532  0.0071  0.0311  0.0176 -0.0947*  -0.0084 -0.0038 
StratIP  20  0.1205*  0.1134*  0.0708*  0.0248  -0.0003  0.0664  0.1862*  0.0614  0.0980*  0.1198* -0.1200* -0.1218*  0.1338*  0.0401 
nbProdRD  21  -0.0144  -0.0059  0.0102  0.0294  0.0286  -0.0169  0.0170  0.0122  0.0298  0.0107  0.0181  0.0752*  -0.0312 -0.0076 
nbProdPC  22  0.0160  0.0522  0.0397  0.0446  0.0367  0.0029  0.0351  0.0683*  0.0688*  0.0479  -0.0133  0.0224  0.0007 -0.0081 
nbProdRC  23  0.0157  0.0253  0.0447  0.0337  0.0263  -0.0146  0.0879*  0.0568  0.0912*  0.0751*  0.0076  0.0245  -0.0051 -0.0056 
nbProdPM  24  0.0540  0.0578  0.0828*  0.0932*  0.0297  0.0227  0.0417  0.027  0.0504  0.056  -0.0109  0.0019  -0.0318 0.0817* 
ProdStage  25 -0.0649*  -0.0806*  0.0021  -0.0300  -0.0467  0.0156  -0.1344* -0.1066* -0.1075* -0.0749*  -0.0031  0.2187* -0.1556* -0.0300 
ln(CostContOut) 26  0.2080*  0.1445*  0.1699*  0.1465*  0.0857*  0.1848*  0.2260*  0.1875*  0.1923*  0.1932*  0.0196 -0.0968*  0.2280*  0.0534 
ln(CostIPR)  27  0.1625*  0.1534*  0.0842*  0.0348  0.0173  0.0550  0.1387*  0.0988*  0.1472*  0.1477* -0.1215*  -0.0204  0.1047* 0.0981* 
ln(RevContIn)  28  0.0696*  0.1020*  -0.0246  0.0839*  0.1012*  0.0037  0.1622*  0.0375  0.03  0.1372*  -0.0639  -0.0329  -0.0263  0.0241 
ln(RevIPR)  29  0.0960*  0.1134*  -0.005  0.1086*  0.1211*  0.0262  0.2684*  0.0922*  0.1674*  0.2270*  -0.0466  -0.0006  0.1775* -0.0247 
ln(RevSales)  30  -0.0448  -0.034  -0.0687  -0.0487  -0.0357  -0.0521  0.0366  0.1426*  0.1326*  0.2010* -0.1369*  0.3246*  0.0297 0.0804* 
dExport  31  0.0419  0.0068  0.0153  0.0304  0.0143  0.0105  -0.0382  0.0181  0.0303  0.0534  -0.0484  0.1305*  -0.0337  0.0148 
ln(FundGov)  32  0.0596  0.0378  0.0419  0.0121  -0.0149  0.0702*  0.0193  0.0153  0.0059  0.0365  -0.0586  -0.0432  0.0001 -0.0323 
ln(FundVC)  33  0.1382*  0.0976*  0.0565  0.0259  0.0108  -0.0119  0.1734*  -0.0035  0.1000*  0.0840*  0.0304 -0.1395*  0.0827*  0.0491 
ln(FundDebt)  34  0.0214  0.0122  0.0201  0.0142  -0.0041  0.0388  0.0410  0.0088  0.0440  0.0815*  -0.0534  0.0166  -0.0120 -0.0059 
ln(FundAng)  35  0.0815*  0.0339  0.0635*  0.0054  -0.0091  0.0089  -0.0308  -0.0158  -0.0108  -0.0507  -0.0075 -0.1131*  0.0070  0.0102 
dFiscInc  36  0.1689*  0.1130*  0.1858*  0.0971*  0.0547  0.1351*  0.2104*  0.1105*  0.1095*  0.1825* -0.0668*  -0.0408  0.0098  0.0679 
ln(FiscInc)  37  0.1842*  0.1376*  0.1619*  0.1232*  0.0837*  0.1460*  0.4241*  0.2466*  0.2159*  0.3844* -0.1272* -0.0783*  0.0909* 0.1039*   28 
Appendix 1 Correlation matrix (continued) 
Variable     15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28 
dSubsInt  15  1 
                          dSpinoff  16 -0.0906*  1 
                        ln(RDExp)  17  0.0945*  0.1676*  1 
                      nbPat  18  0.0533  0.0761*  0.2337*  1 
                    StratKnow  19  -0.0343  0.1292*  0.1636*  0.0604  1 
                  StratIP  20  -0.0209  0.1844*  0.3483*  0.1202*  0.4230*  1 
                nbProdRD  21  -0.0140  -0.0392  0.0128  0.0006  0.0573  0.0383  1 
              nbProdPC  22  0.0024  -0.0267  0.0558  0.0296  0.0141  -0.0396  0.3974*  1 
            nbProdRC  23  0.1001*  -0.0428  0.0686*  0.0174  -0.0309  0.0018  0.4309*  0.6587*  1 
          nbProdPM  24  -0.0011  0.0271  0.0078  0.006  -0.0308  0.0032  0.1841*  0.1463*  0.2327*  1 
        ProdStage  25  0.0261  -0.1568* -0.3054*  -0.0842*  -0.0656  -0.1866*  0.0000  -0.0479  -0.0453  0.0915*  1 
      ln(CostContOut) 26  -0.0084  0.2059*  0.4302*  0.1420*  0.1792*  0.2407*  0.0058  0.0694*  0.0793*  0.0121 -0.2547*  1 
    ln(CostIPR)  27  -0.0105  0.0623  0.1597*  0.0801*  0.0226  0.0972*  0.0119  0.0014  0.0039  0.1498*  -0.0596  0.1586*  1 
  ln(RevContIn)  28  -0.0035  -0.0328  0.0609  -0.0264  0.0304  -0.1022*  -0.0068  0.0034  -0.0074  0.1030*  0.0102 -0.0756*  0.0199  1 
ln(RevIPR)  29  -0.0379  0.0258  0.1693*  0.032  0.0696*  0.0578  0.1259*  0.1306*  0.0100  -0.0206 -0.0889*  0.1045*  0.0909* 0.0967* 
ln(RevSales)  30  0.1134*  -0.2680* -0.0706*  0.0486  -0.1227*  -0.2009*  0.0371  0.0230  0.0512  0.0901*  0.2793* -0.1555*  0.0478  0.0014 
dExport  31  -0.0013  -0.1076* -0.1397*  -0.0757*  -0.0394  -0.1004*  0.0109  0.0344  0.0330  0.1011*  0.2892* -0.1154*  -0.0158 0.1060* 
ln(FundGov)  32  -0.0282  0.0248  0.0615  -0.0074  0.0143  0.0480  -0.0197  -0.002  -0.0155  -0.0072  -0.0128  0.0236  0.0050  0.0230 
ln(FundVC)  33  -0.0505  0.1847*  0.2146*  0.1354*  0.0274  0.1816*  -0.0158  -0.0112  -0.0193  0.0756* -0.1036*  0.1685*  0.1167* -0.0667 
ln(FundDebt)  34  -0.0224  -0.0536  0.0354  0.0079  -0.0313  0.0359  -0.0126  0.0150  -0.0082  0.0181  -0.0207  0.0072  -0.0075  0.0258 
ln(FundAng)  35  -0.0571  0.0914*  0.0368  0.0642*  0.0313  0.0779*  0.006  -0.0076  0.0170  0.0035  -0.0425  0.0704*  0.0290 -0.0546 
dFiscInc  36  -0.0254  0.1183*  0.3233*  0.0295  0.0857*  0.1718*  0.0281  0.0327  0.0306  0.0353  -0.0543  0.1814*  0.0725*  0.0191 
ln(FiscInc)  37  -0.0004  0.1575*  0.5417*  0.0998*  0.1223*  0.2536*  0.0025  0.0155  0.0597  0.0396 -0.1435*  0.3125*  0.1410*  0.0424 
                               
Variable     29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37 
          ln(RevIPR)  29  1 
                         ln(RevSales)  30  0.0472  1 
                       dExport  31  -0.0079  0.3342*  1 
                     ln(FundGov)  32  -0.0089  -0.0715*  0.0284  1 
                   ln(FundVC)  33  0.0213  -0.1655* -0.0911*  0.1365*  1 
                 ln(FundDebt)  34  0.0144  0.0159  0.0465  0.3030*  0.0436  1 
               ln(FundAng)  35  -0.0229  -0.1631*  0.0081  0.1518*  0.0624*  0.0823*  1 
             dFiscInc  36  0.0487  -0.0755*  0.0095  0.0392  0.0911*  0.0446  0.0453  1 
            ln(FiscInc)  37  0.1263*  -0.0642 -0.0869*  0.032  0.1509*  0.0794*  -0.0066  0.8425*  1 
             29 
Appendix 2 – Results excluding the 1999 survey 
Correction for endogeneity (first stage equation) – SMEs excluding the 1999 survey 
First stage  (5) ln(RDExp)  (6) StratIP  (7) ln(CostContOut) 
nbCollPriv  0.0092  (0.0064)   -0.0026  (0.0050) 
 
-0.0083 (0.0208) 
  ln(FundGov)  0.0293  (0.0161) *  0.0002  (0.0141) 
 
-0.0227 (0.0378) 
  ln(FundVC)  0.0359  (0.0109) ***  0.0150  (0.0076) **  0.0321 (0.0262) 
  ln(FundDebt)  -0.0010  (0.0217)   0.0126  (0.0160) 
 
0.0028 (0.0364) 
  ln(FundAng)  -0.0004  (0.0154)   0.0042  (0.0136) 
 
-0.0228 (0.0333) 
  nbEmpBio  -0.0018  (0.0053)   0.0023  (0.0021) 
 
0.0090 (0.0091) 
  HHIEmp  -0.7536  (0.2493) ***  -0.5577  (0.1597) ***  -0.4407 (0.4654) 
  Age  -0.0108  (0.0062) *  0.0037  (0.0029) 
 
0.0110 (0.0088) 
  dPub  0.7332  (0.1485) ***  0.1360  (0.1064) 
 
0.5232 (0.2882) * 
dMerg  0.0648  (0.1955)   -0.0044  (0.1040) 
 
-0.0691 (0.3490) 
  dSubsInt  0.7153  (0.1998) ***  0.0359  (0.1246) 
 
0.0074 (0.3648) 
  dSpinoff  0.0869  (0.1053)   0.1132  (0.0821) 
 
0.8229 (0.2286) *** 
ln(nbPat)  0.1973  (0.0540) ***  0.1349  (0.0387) ***  0.3498 (0.1041) *** 
ProdStage  -0.3375  (0.0678) ***  -0.0879  (0.0472) *  -0.3600 (0.1254) *** 
ln(RevContIn)  0.0167  (0.0204)   -0.0535  (0.0153) ***  -0.0877 (0.0411) ** 
ln(RevIPR)  -0.0066  (0.0260)   0.0003  (0.0212) 
 
0.0376 (0.0680) 
  ln(RevSales)  0.0252  (0.0195)   -0.0414  (0.0125) ***  -0.0597 (0.0354) * 
dExport  -0.2250  (0.1413)   -0.0215  (0.0989) 
 
-0.2970 (0.2272) 
  nbEmpRes  0.0391  (0.0085) *** 
 
 
   
 
  ln(FiscInc)  0.2474  (0.0272) *** 
 
 
   
 
  ln(RDExpSD)  0.0799  (0.1392)  
 
 
   
 
  StratKnow 
 
   0.4712  (0.0395) *** 
 
 
  nbEmpReg 
 
   -0.0298  (0.0181) * 
 
 
  StratIPSD 
 
   0.6835  (0.1524) *** 
 
 





















  Constant  5.3067  (0.9120) ***  0.1181  (0.4898) 
 
2.7129 (0.6962) *** 
Subdomain, province and survey-year dummies 
 
/ath  -0.4353  (0.1254) ***  0.1353  (0.1315) 
 
-0.0472 (0.6347) 
  /ln()  0.3481  (0.0423) ***  -0.0031  (0.0238) 
 
0.9683 (0.0215) *** 
 -0.4097  (0.1043)   0.1344  (0.1292) 
 
-0.0472 (0.6332) 
   1.4164  (0.0599)   0.9969  (0.0237) 
 
2.6334 (0.0567) 
  Wald test of exogeneity (/ath=0): 
2  12.05   ***  1.06     0.01    
Nb observations  811     811  
 
811   
  Nb firms  528     528  
 
528  
  F(29,527)  28.3   ***  21.22   ***  10.25   *** 
R
2  0.5539     0.3534  
 
0.2522  
  Root MSE  1.4433     1.0158  
 
2.6835  
  Notes:  ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix 3 – Results including the 1999 survey 
Probit regression results for PatApp – SMEs including the 1999 survey 
SMEs with 1999  (1’)    (2’)    (4’)    (5’)    (7’)   
nbEmpBio  0.0091 ***  0.0029 
 































  ln(FundVC)  0.0242 **  0.0152 
 





































































































  ProdStage  -0.1673 ***  -0.0946 
 











































  ln(RDExp) 
   
0.2022 *** 
   
0.4105 *** 
   
     
(0.0287) 
     
(0.0715) 
      ln(CostContOut) 
       
0.0469 *** 
   
0.0502 
 
         
(0.0172) 
     
(0.1877) 
  Constant  -0.2723 
 
-1.4701 ***  -0.3952 
 












  Subdomain, province and survey-year dummies 
 









  Nb firms  606   606   606   606   606  
Pseudo R















2  218.49 ***  245.59 ***  217.37 ***  333.16 ***  218.71 *** 
Notes:  ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
LL = Log Pseudolikelihood. 
   31 
Correction for endogeneity (first stage equation) – SMEs including the 1999 survey 
First stage  (5’)      (7’)     
dCollPriv  0.1027  (0.0969) 
 
0.3280  (0.2175) 
  ln(FundGov)  0.0344  (0.0148)  **  0.0043  (0.0349) 
  ln(FundVC)  0.0332  (0.0113)  ***  0.0369  (0.0235) 
  ln(FundDebt)  -0.0008  (0.0219) 
 
0.0099  (0.0339) 
  ln(FundAng)  0.0055  (0.0119) 
 
0.0213  (0.0294) 
  nbEmpBio  0.0089  (0.0041)  **  0.0032  (0.0076)   
HHIEmp  0.0575  (0.0894) 
 
0.2185  (0.1028)  ** 
dSpinoff  0.1132  (0.0976) 
 
0.5731  (0.2079)  *** 
ln(nbPat)  0.2882  (0.0505)  ***  0.4379  (0.0892)  *** 
ProdStage  -0.3855  (0.0642)  ***  -0.4761  (0.1146)  *** 
ln(Rev)  0.0611  (0.0199)  ***  -0.0072  (0.0347) 
  dExport  -0.3640  (0.1330)  ***  -0.2529  (0.2079) 
  nbEmpRes  0.0379  (0.0068)  *** 
 
 
  dFiscInc  1.0012  (0.1536)  *** 
 
 
  ln(RDExpSD)  0.2879  (0.1233)  ** 
 
 









0.0607  (0.0580) 
  Constant  3.1804  (0.8970)  ***  2.3829  (0.5202)  *** 
             
/ath  -0.4004  (0.1557)  ***  -0.0091  (0.5253) 
  /ln()  0.4352  (0.0376)  ***  1.0123  (0.0208)  *** 
 -0.3802  (0.1332) 
 
-0.0091  (0.5252) 
   1.5452  (0.0581) 
 
2.7520  (0.0571) 
  Wald test of exogeneity (/ath=0): 
2  6.61    ***  0.00     
Nb observations  1001   
 
1001   
  Nb firms  606   
 
606   
  F(23,605)  30.66    ***  14.17    *** 
R
2  0.4574   
 
0.2145   
  Root MSE  1.5641   
 
2.7841   
  Notes:  ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 